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They are not capable
to ground a canonicity
of universal consistency.
—Alexandra Deligiorgi
(ΠAI∆EIA, 1998)
Abstract
We explore how different proof orderings induce different notions of satura-
tion. We relate completion, paramodulation, saturation, redundancy elimination,
and rewrite system reduction to proof orderings.
1 Introduction
We show how to define the canonical basis of an abstract deductive system
in three distinct ways: (1) Formulæ appearing in minimal proofs; (2) non-
redundant lemmata; (3) minimal trivial theorems. Well-founded orderings of proofs
[Bachmair and Dershowitz, 1994] are used to distinguish between cheap “direct”
proofs, those that are of a computational flavor (e.g. rewrite proofs), and expensive
“indirect” proofs, those that require search to find. This approach suggests generaliza-
tions of the concepts of “redundancy” and “saturation”, as elaborated by Nieuwenhuis
and Rubio in [2001]. Saturated, for us, means that all cheap proofs are supported. By
considering different orderings on proofs, one gets different kinds of saturated sets.
This work continues our development of an abstract theory of “canonical infer-
ence”, initiated in [Dershowitz and Kirchner, 2003b]. Although we will use ground
equations as an illustrative example, the framework applies equally well in the first-
order setting, whether equational or clausal. Though our motivation is primarily æs-
thetic; our expectation is that practical applications will follow.
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Proofs and other details omitted here will be included in
[Dershowitz and Kirchner, 2003a]. Our rewriting terminology accords with
[Dershowitz and Plaisted, 2001].
2 Proof Systems
Let A be the set of all formulæ (ground equations and disequations, in our examples)
over some fixed vocabulary. Let P be the set of all (ground equational) proofs. We are
given two functions: Γ : P → 2A gives the assumptions in a proof, and ∆ : P → A
gives its conclusion. Both are extended to sets of proofs in the usual fashion. (We
assume for simplicity that proofs use only a finite number of assumptions.)
The framework proposed here is predicated on two well-founded partial orderings
over P: a proof ordering ≥; and a subproof relation ☎. They are related by a mono-
tonicity requirement given below (7).
We will use the term presentation to mean a set of formulæ, and justification to
mean a set of proofs. We reserve the term theory for deductively closed presentations.
Let A∗ denote the theory of presentation A, that is, the set of conclusions of all proofs
with assumptions A:
A∗ := ∆ Γ−1A = {∆ p : p ∈ P, Γ p = A} (1)
We assume the following three standard properties of Tarskian consequence relations:
A∗ ⊆ (A ∪B)∗ (2)
A ⊆ A∗ (3)
A∗∗ = A∗ (4)
Thus, -∗ is a closure operation. We say that presentation A is a basis for theory B if
A∗ = B. PresentationsA andB are equivalent if their theories are identical: A∗ = B∗.
As a very simple running example, let the vocabulary consist of the constant 0 and
unary symbol s. Abbreviate tally terms si0 as numeral i. The set A consists of all
unordered equations i = j (so symmetry is built into the structure of proofs). We
postpone dealing with disequations for the time being. An equational inference system
for this vocabulary might consist of the following inference rules:

0 = 0
Z
i = j
i = j
Ii=j
i = j j = k
i = k
T
i = j
si = sj
S
where the proof tree branches (of T ) are unordered. To accommodate (2), we also need
projection:
a c
c
P
For example, if A = {4 = 2, 4 = 0}, then A∗ = {i = j : i ≡ j (mod 2)}.
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Consider the proof schemata:

0 = 0
1 = 1
.
.
.
i = i
4 = 0
4 = 0
4 = 2
4 = 2
2 = 0
.
.
.
i− j − 2 = 0
i− j − 1 = 1
i− j = 2
i− j = 0
.
.
.
i = j
Let’s use proof terms for proofs, denoting the above two trees by SiZ and
SjT (T (I(4, 0), I(4, 2)), SS(∇i−j−2=0)), respectively. With a recursive path order-
ing to order proofs, precedence Z < S < T < I < P < 0 < 1 < 2 < · · ·, and
multiset “status” for I , minimal proofs of the theorems in A∗ must take one of these
two forms, or the form of one of their subproofs.
We call a proof trivial when it proves only itself and has no subproofs other than
itself, that is, if Γ p = {∆ p} and p☎ q ⇒ p = q. We denote by â such a trivial proof
of a ∈ A and by Â the set of trivial proofs of each a ∈ A. We assume that proofs
use their assumptions, that subproofs don’t use non-existent assumptions, and—most
significantly—that proof orderings are monotonic with respect to subproofs. Specifi-
cally, for all proofs p, q, r and formulæ a:
a ∈ Γ p ⇒ p☎ â (5)
p☎ q ⇒ Γ p ⊇ Γ q (6)
p✄ q > r ∧∆ q = ∆ r ⇒ ∃v ∈ P. p > v ✄ r ∧∆ p = ∆ v (7)
We make no other assumptions regarding proofs or their structure.
Every formula a admits a trivial proof â by (3,5). Let Σp = {q : p ☎ q} denote
the subproofs of p, and likewise ΣP = ∪p∈PΣp. This way, (5) can be abbreviated
Γ̂ p ⊆ Σp.
It may be convenient to think of a proof-tree “leaf” as a subproof with only itself
as a subproof; other subproofs are the “internal nodes”. There are two kinds of leaves:
trivial proofs â (such as inferences I), and vacuous proofs a¯ with Γ a¯ = ∅ and ∆ a¯ = a
(such as Z). By well-foundedness of ☎, there are no infinite “paths” in proof trees.
Postulate (7) states that > (restricted to proofs with the same conclusion) and ✄
commute (i.e. ✄ ◦ > ⊆ > ◦✄), from which it follows that their union, the partial
ordering (✄ ∪>)∗, is also well-founded.
3 Canonical Systems
Denote the set of proofs using assumptions A by:
ΠA := {p ∈ P : Γ p ⊆ A}
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and define the minimal proofs in a set of proofs as:
µP := {p ∈ P : ¬∃q ∈ P. ∆ q = ∆ p, q < p}
On account of well-foundedness, minimal proofs always exist.
Proposition 1 For all presentations A,B:
ΓΠA ⊆ A (8)
ΣµΠA ⊆ µΠA (9)
ΠΓΠA = ΠA (10)
ΠA = ΠB ⇔ A = B (11)
And for all justifications P : P ⊆ ΠΓP .
We say that presentation A is reduced when A = ΓµΠA. Our main definition is:
Definition 1 (Canonical Presentation) The canonical presentation contains those for-
mulæ that appear as assumptions of minimal proofs:
A♯ := ΓµΠA∗
So, we say that A is canonical if A = A♯.
Proof orderings are lifted to sets of proofs, as follows:
Definition 2 Justification Q is better than justification P if:
P ⊒ Q :≡ ∀p ∈ P. ∃q ∈ Q.∆ q = ∆ p ∧ p ≥ q
It is much better if:
P ❂ Q :≡ ∀p ∈ P. ∃q ∈ Q.∆ q = ∆ p ∧ p > q
Justifications are similar if:
P ≃ Q :≡ P ⊒ Q ⊒ P
These three relations are compatible: ⊒ ◦ ❂ ⊆ ❂, ⊒ ◦ ≃ ⊆ ⊒, etc.
The following statements can be shown to hold:
Proposition 2 For all justifications P,Q:
P ⊒ µP (12)
P ⊒ Q ⇔ µP ⊒ µQ (13)
P ❂ Q ⇔ µP ❂ µQ (14)
P ≃ Q ⇔ µP = µQ (15)
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Proposition 3 The relation ⊒ is a quasi-ordering on proofs and a partial ordering of
minimal proofs.
This quasi-ordering on proofs is lifted to sets of formulæ as follows:
Definition 3 Presentation B is said to be simpler than an equivalent presentation A
when B provides better proofs than does A: A % B :≡ A∗ = B∗ ∧ ΠA ⊒ ΠB.
Presentations are similar if: A ≈ B :≡ ΠA ≃ ΠB.
These relations are also compatible.
Proposition 4 For all presentations A,B:
ΠA ⊒ Π(A ∪B) (16)
A ≈ B ⇔ µΠA = µΠB (17)
B ⊆ A ∧ ΠA ⊒ ΠB ⇒ A ≈ B (18)
A ⊆ B ∧ A∗ = B∗ ⇒ A % B (19)
Proposition 5 The relation % is a quasi-ordering and ≈ is its associated equivalence
relation.
The function ♯ is “canonical” with respect to equivalence of presentations. That
is: A♯∗ = A∗; A∗ = B∗ ⇔ A♯ = B♯; and A♯ ♯ = A♯. This justifies the terminology of
Definition 1.
Lemma 1 A % A♯.
4 Saturated Systems
By a “normal-form proof”, we will mean a proof in µΠA∗. On account of (7), all
subproofs of normal-form proofs are also in normal form. We propose the following
definitions:
Definition 4 (Saturation) A presentation A is saturated if it supports all possible nor-
mal form proofs: ΠA ⊇ µΠA∗. A presentation A is complete if every theorem has a
normal form proof: A∗ = ∆(ΠA ∩ µΠA∗).
A presentation is complete if it is saturated, but for the converse, we need a further
hypothesis: minimal proofs are unique if for all theorems c ∈ ΠA there is exactly one
minimal proof in µΠA∗ with conclusion c.
Proposition 6 If minimal proofs are unique, then a presentation is saturated iff it is
complete.
For example, suppose all rewrite (valley) proofs are minimal but incomparable.
Then any Church-Rosser system is complete, since every identity has a rewrite prof,
but only the full deductive closure is saturated.
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Theorem 1 A presentation A is saturated iff it contains its own canonical presenta-
tion: A ⊇ A♯. In particular, A♯ is saturated. Moreover, A♯ is the smallest saturated
set: no equivalent proper subset of A♯ is saturated; if A is saturated, then every equiv-
alent superset also is.
Corollary 1 Presentation A is saturated iff A∗ ≈ A.
Proof. It is always the case that A % A∗ % A♯. If A is saturated, then A ⊇ A♯ and,
therefore, A∗ % A♯ % A. For the other direction, suppose p ∈ µΠA∗. Since A is
similar, there must be a proof q ∈ ΠA ⊆ ΠA∗, such that q ≤ p. But q 6< p, so p ∈ ΠA.
It follows that µΠA∗ ⊆ ΠA, and A is saturated.
Lemma 2 Similar presentations are either both saturated or neither is; similar pre-
sentations are either both complete or neither is.
Proof. The first claim follows directly from the previous result. For the second, one
can verify that A ≈ B implies:
B∗ = A∗ = ∆(ΠA ∩ µΠA∗) = ∆ (µΠA ∩ µΠA∗)
= ∆ (µΠB ∩ µΠB∗) = ∆ (ΠB ∩ µΠB∗)
Formulæ that can be removed from a presentation—without making proofs
worse—are “redundant”:
Definition 5 (Redundancy) A set R of formulæ is (globally) redundant with respect
to a presentation A when: A ∪R % A \ R. The set of all (locally) redundant formulæ
of a given presentation A will be denoted ρA:
ρA := {r ∈ A : A % A \ {r}}
A presentation A is irredundant if ρA = ∅.
It can be shown that A is reduced iff it is irredundant.
Lemma 3 The canonical presentation is reduced: ρA♯ = ∅.
Proposition 7 The following facts hold for all presentations A:
A ≈ A \ ρA (20)
A♯ = A∗ \ ρA∗ (21)
A♯ = ∆(µΠA∗ ∩ Â∗) (22)
Â♯ = µΠA∗ ∩ Â∗ (23)
It is thanks to well-foundedness of > that the set of all locally redundant formulæ
in ρA is globally redundant (Eq. 20). The alternate definition of the canonical set (22)
is made possible by the properties of subproofs.
Theorem 2 A presentation is canonical iff it is saturated and reduced.
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Proof. One direction follows immediately from Theorem 1 and Lemma 3. For the
other direction, let A be saturated and reduced. We aim to show that A = A♯. By
Lemma 1, A % A♯ and the two presentations are equivalent. If A is saturated, then by
Theorem 1, A ⊇ A♯. By (19), for any r ∈ A \ A♯, A % A♯ % A \ {r}. But ρA = ∅,
since A is reduced, so it cannot be that r ∈ A. In other words, A \ A♯ = ∅, and A is
canonical.
Returning to our simple example, we can add three inference rules for disequalities:
i = j j 6= k
i 6= k
T
i 6= i
j = k
Fj=k
i 6= j
i 6= j
Ii6=j
With them, one can infer, for example, 0 6= 0 from 1 6= 1. If F is smaller than
other proof combinators, and I nodes are incomparable, then the canonical basis of
any inconsistent set is {i 6= j : i, j ∈ N}. All positive equations are redundant.
5 Variations
Consider the above inference rules for ground equality and disequality: S, T, F, I, Z ,
with S extended to apply to all function symbols of any arity. Suppose we are using
something like the recursive path ordering for proof terms.
Refutation. If the inference rule F is the cheapest in the proof ordering, T < I , and
I(i, j) nodes are measured by the values of i and j, then the canonical basis of any
inconsistent presentation is a (smallest) trivial disequation {t 6= t}.
Deduction. If the proof ordering prefers direct application I of axioms over all other
inferences (including Z), then trivial proofs are best. In that case, ρA∗ = ∅ and the
canonical basis includes the whole theory A♯ = A∗.
Paramodulation. If the proof ordering makes functional reflexivity S smaller than
I , but the only ordering on leaves is I(u, t) ≤ I(c[u], c[t]) for any context c, then
the canonical basis will be the congruence closure, as generated by paramodulation:
ρA = {f(u1, . . . , un) = f(t1, . . . , tn) : u1 = t1, . . . , un = tn ∈ A∗}. The theory
A∗ is the closure under functional reflexivity of the basis A♯. If A is as in our first
example, then A♯ = {2j = 0 : j > 0}.
Completion. On the other hand, if the ordering on leaves compares terms in some
simplification ordering ≥≥, then the canonical basis will be the fully reduced set, as
generated by (ground) completion: ρA = {u = u} ∪ {u = t : t = v ∈ A∗, t ≫
v, v is not u}. For our first example, A♯ = {2 = 0}. For another example, if
A = {a = c, sa = b} and sa ≫ sb ≫ sc ≫ a ≫ b ≫ c, then I(sa, b) >
T (S(I(a, c)), I(sc, b)), and hence A♯ = {a = c, sc = b}.
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Superposition. If one distinguishes between T steps based on the weight of the
shared term j, making T > I when j is the smallest, and T < I otherwise, then the
canonical basis is also closed under paramodulation into the larger side of equations.
6 Derivations
Theorem proving with simplification entails two processes: Expansion, whereby any
sound deductions (anything in E∗) may be added to the set of derived theorems; and
Contraction, whereby any redundancies (anything in ρE) may be removed.
A sequence of presentations E0 ❀ E1 ❀ · · · is called a derivation. Let E∗ =
∪iEi. The result of the derivation is, as usual [Bachmair and Dershowitz, 1994], its
persisting formulæ:
E∞ := lim inf
j→∞
Ej
We will say that a proof p persists when Γ p ⊆ E∞. Thus, if a proof persists, so do its
subproofs (by 6). By (16), we have ΠEi ⊒ ΠE∗.
Definition 6 A derivation E0 ❀ E1 ❀ · · · is good if Ei % Ei+1 for all i.
We are only interested in good derivations. From here on in, only good derivations
will be considered. It is easy to see that:
Lemma 4 Derivations, the steps of which are expansions and contractions, are good.
Proposition 8 If a derivation is good, then the limit supports the best proofs: E∗ ≈
E∞.
Proof. One direction, namelyΠE∞ ⊒ ΠE∗, follows by (16) from the fact thatE∞ ⊆
E∗. To establish that ΠE∗ ⊒ ΠE∞, we show that µΠE∗ ⊒ ΠE∞ and rely on (12).
Suppose p ∈ µΠE∗. It follows from (5,9) that Γ̂ p ⊆ Σp ⊆ µΠE∗ ⊆ µΠE∗. By
goodness, each a ∈ Γ p persists from some Ei on. Hence, Γ p ⊆ E∞, and p ∈ ΠE∞.
Definition 7 A good derivation is fair if C(E∞) ❂ ΠE∗ where C(E) is the set of
critical proof obligations:
C(E) := {p ∈ ΠE : p /∈ µΠE∗, ∀q ✁ p. q ∈ µΠE∗} (24)
It is clean if ρE∗ ∩ E∞ = ∅.
Critical obligations are proofs that are not in normal form but all of whose proper
subproofs are already in normal form. Fairness means that all persistent obligations are
eventually “subsumed” by a strictly smaller proof.
Lemma 5 If a derivation is clean, then its limit is reduced.
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Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that some r ∈ ρE∞ ⊆ E∞ ⊆ E∗. Consider r̂, and
compare it to a smaller proof p ∈ ΠE∞. Let A = Γ p ⊆ E∞ ⊆ E∗. Let q ∈ µΠE∗.
Were r ∈ Γ q, then replacing r̂ as a subproof of q with p, would by (7) result in a
smaller proof than q. It follows that r ∈ ρE∗, which contradicts cleanliness.
Lemma 6 If a derivation is fair, then its limit is complete.
Proof. Any presentation A is complete if ΠA ⊒ ΠA ∩ µΠA∗. since a ∈ A∗ implies
a ∈ ∆(ΠA∩µΠA∗), whence completeness. Let A = E∗ be all formulæ proved at any
stage in the derivation. We show that A is complete in the above manner. Completeness
of E∞ follows from Lemma 2. Consider any proof in p ∈ ΠA of a. Let p∞ ∈ ΠE∞ ⊆
ΠA be the persisting proof of a, for which p∞ ≤ p by the previous proposition. If
p∞ ∈ µΠA∗, we’re done. Otherwise, p∞ has a minimal (with respect to ✂) non-
normal-form (possibly trivial) subproof q, all subproofs of which (persist and) are in
normal form. By fairness, there is a proof r ∈ ΠA of the same theorem as q such that
p∞☎ q > r. By (7), there is therefore a better proof p′ < p∞ ≤ p. By induction, there
is a p′′ ≤ p′ in both ΠA and µΠA∗, also proving a.
For example, suppose a proof ordering makes ĉ > aˆ
c
and cˆ
a
> â. Start with
E0 = {c}, and consider ĉ. Were ĉ to persist, then by fairness a better proof would
evolve, the better proof being aˆ
c
. If â is in normal form, then a ∈ E∞ and both minimal
proofs persist. Another example: µP = {â, ĉ, aˆ
c
} and E = {a}, then E ❀ E ❀ · · ·
is fair, since E∞ = E and C(E∞) = ∅. The result is complete but unsaturated (c is
missing).
Together, these lemmata and Proposition 6 yield:
Theorem 3 If minimal proofs are unique and a derivation is fair and clean, then its
limit is canonical.
By (22), this also means that each e ∈ E∞ is its own ultimate proof ê, so is not
susceptible to contraction.
Returning to our main example, if projection P is the most expensive type of infer-
ence, then no minimal proof includes it. And if proofs are compared in a simplification
ordering (subproofs are always smaller than their superproofs), then minimal proofs
will never have superfluous transitivity inferences of the form
u = t t = t
u = t
T
Let ≥≥ be a total simplification-ordering of terms, let P > I > T > S > Z in the
precedence, let proofs be greater than terms, and compare proof trees in the corre-
sponding total recursive path simplification-ordering. Ground completion is an infer-
ence mechanism consisting of the following inference rules:
Deduce: E ∪ {w = t[u]} ❀ E ∪ {w = t[v]} if u = v ∈ E and u≫ v
Delete: E ∪ {t = t} ❀ E
Furthermore, operationally, completion implements these inferences “fairly”: No per-
sistently enabled inference rule is ignored forever.
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Corollary 2 (Completeness of Completion) Ground completion results—at the
limit—in the canonical, Church-Rosser basis: E∞ = E♯0.
Proof. Ground completion is good, since Deduce and Delete don’t increase proofs
(❀⊆%). In particular, I(w, t[u]) > T (I(w, t[v]), Sn(I(u, v))) if u≫ v, since t[u]≫
t[v] and t[u] ≥≥ u≫ v. Ground completion is fair and clean. For example, the critical
obligation
w = t t = v
w = v
T
when t ≫ w, v, is resolved by Deduce. Also, since T > S, non-critical cases resolve
naturally:
w = t
fw = ft
t = v
ft = fv
fw = fv
>
w = t t = v
w = v
fw = fv
7 Discussion
We have suggested here that proof orderings, rather than formula orderings, take center
stage in theorem proving with contraction (simplification and deletion of formulæ).
Given a proof ordering that distinguishes “good proofs” from “bad proofs”, it makes
sense to define completeness of a set of formulæ as the claim that all theorems enjoy
a smallest (“best”) proof. Then an inference system is complete if it has the ability
to generate all formulæ needed for such ideal proofs. Given a formula ordering, one
can, of course, choose to compare proofs by simply comparing the multiset of their
assumptions.1
The notion of “saturation” in theorem proving, in which superfluous deductions are
not necessary for completeness, was suggested by Rusinowitch [1989, pp. 99–100] in
the context of a Horn-clause resolution calculus. In our terminology: A presentation
was said to be saturated when all inferrible formulæ are subsumed by formulæ in the
presentation. This concept was refined by Bachmair and Ganzinger (see, most recently,
[2001]) and by Nieuwenhuis and Rubio [2001, pp. 29–42]. They define saturation in
terms of a more general kind of redundancy: An inference is redundant if its conclusion
can be inferred from smaller formulæ; a presentation is saturated if every inference is
redundant.
We propose alternate definitions of saturation and redundancy, defining both
in terms of the proof ordering. This appears to be more flexible, since it al-
lows small proofs to use large assumptions. The definition of redundancy in
[Nieuwenhuis and Rubio, 2001] coincides with ours when proofs are measured first
by their maximal assumption.
In [Bachmair and Dershowitz, 1994], a completion sequence is deemed fair if all
persistent critical inferences are generated. In [Nieuwenhuis and Rubio, 2001, fn. 8],
1A well-founded proof ordering on P can induce a well-founded formula ordering on A: Define a ≥≥ c
if there exist p, q ∈ µP such that q ☎ p,∆ p = a, and ∆ q = c.
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an inference sequence is held to be fair if all persistent inferences are either generated or
become redundant. The definition of fairness propounded here combines the two ideas.
But fairness only earns completeness, not saturation. (A stronger version of fairness
is needed for saturation when the proof ordering is partial.) Our definition of critical
obligations also allows one to incorporate “critical pair criteria” [Kapur et al., 1988;
Bachmair and Dershowitz, 1988].
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